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1. ‘Stumpf, who will save you from Brentano?’ 
 Carl Stumpf (1848–1937) is a key figure in the fin de siècle ger-
manophone philosophy. Unfortunately, after the World War One, the 
interest towards Stumpf as a philosopher waned. One of the reasons 
was that already in the 1920s the attention of the mainstream philoso-
phers shifted in direction of the rising rivalry between analytic and 
continental philosophy. The authors of Stumpf’s Festshrift of 1923 
were mainly psychologists from the Berlin Institute of Psychology, 
grounded by Stumpf in 1906.  
The interest towards Carl Stumpf’s philosophy was revived only 
in the last twenty years or so. Great service in this provided the Neo-
Brentanists.1 But while the association of Carl Stumpf with Franz 
Brentano fostered Stumpf studies, it also gave rise of one-sided inter-
pretations of Stumpf as a philosopher. In this way his importance and 
idiosyncrasy as philosopher remained in shadow. In this connection it 
deserves notice that before the World War Two, Carl Stumpf was 
considered an autonomous philosophically oriented psychologist, not 
simply another member of Franz Brentano’s school. (Moog 1922, 
157–61; Lehmann 1943, 107–13) 
One of the objectives of this paper is to free Stumpf from Brenta-
no: to try to see him as an autonomous philosopher. There is no better 
means for achieving this aim than the study of the relatedness between 
Carl Stumpf and his PhD and Habilitation Thesis supervisor Herman 
Lotze—Stumpf received his PhD in 1868, and his Habilitation in 
1870—at the University of Göttingen. Between 1870 and 1873 
Stumpf was also an Adjunct Professor (Privatdozent) at that Universi-
ty where Lotze was a distinguished Professor. Soon Lotze became his 
‘devoted fatherly adviser’ (1917, 5). The professor and his student 
                                                            
1 Carl Stumpf Society was founded only in 2010. Cf. http://www.carl-stumpf.de/ 
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were so closely befriended that in 1869 Lotze seriously contemplated 
the possibility to visit Stumpf in Würzburg or Aschaffenburg during 
the summer vacation. (Lotze 2003, 541) Small wander, therefore, that 
Stumpf’s first book Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raum-
vorstellung (1873), that was praised by such figures like William 
James and Bertrand Russell, was dedicated to Lotze. 
 But it was not only Lotze that helped Stumpf to distance himself 
from his teacher and inspiration Franz Brentano.  In Selbstdarstellung 
Stumpf also remembered that his real interest in sciences developed 
first in Göttingen where he also studied physics under Friedrich Kohl-
rausch and Wilhelm Weber. Together with the mathematician Felix 
Klein, Stumpf founded the ‘Eskimo Society’ of young scientists that 
read papers in different academic disciplines—Stumpf presented the 
position of philosophy. (1924, 8) In these years Stumpf also stroke up 
acquaintanceship with Leipzig psychophysics Fechner and E. H. We-
ber. 
 Of course, Stumpf was explicit that Franz Brentano played a cen-
tral role in his philosophical development. Later Stumpf remembered: 
 
My whole understanding of philosophy, the correct and mistaken 
methods of philosophizing, the basic and essential doctrines of logic 
and epistemology, psychology, ethics and metaphysics, which I still 
maintain today, are his doctrines. (1919, 144) 
 
But he also noted that ‘[Lotze’s] way of thinking had influenced my 
thinking more than Brentano wanted it to be the case, despite the fact 
that the outline of my epistemology remained that of Brentano.’ 
(Stumpf 1924, 4–5) Finally, Stumpf was also cautious enough to note 
that ‘in general, such questions of property can be better judged by 
third parties, since those who do not pertain to the family can easily to 
discern family resemblances.’ (1919, 144)  
 This, exactly, will be our task in this paper: We shall try to outline 
which parts of Carl Stumpf’s philosophy were developed under Bren-
tano’s influence and which parts under Lotze’s, profiting from the 
distance in time. 
 
2. Zeitgeist 
Traditionally, philosophers are classified according to the coun-
tries in which they were born, received their education and made aca-
demic career. But it can be also insightful to group together philoso-
phers that were born in the same year. If we follow this approach, we 
shall see that many influential European philosophers were born in 
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1848: the year of sweeping political revolutions all over Europe, in 
Germany, in particular. Besides Carl Stumpf, in that year were also 
born Gottlob Frege, Wilhelm Windelband, Hermann Diels, Johannes 
Rehmke and Johannes Volkelt, in Germany, Arthur Balfour and Ber-
nard Bosanquet, in the United Kingdom. The question arises: what 
shaped the philosophical formation of this group of philosophers? 
Our guess is that it was the outstanding figure of Hermann Lotze. 
In 1864 Lotze published the third volume of his Microcosms, the first 
two volumes being issued in 1856 and 1858, respectively, which made 
him one of the most established philosophers of the time worldwide. 
At least four of our authors, Windelband, Frege, Stumpf, and Bonsan-
quet, were clearly influenced by Lotze: Windelband was his closest 
follower, Frege discussed Lotze’s ‘greater’ Logik in his ‘17 Key Sen-
tences to Logic’, and Bosanquet was instrumental by the translation of 
the same book of Lotze and also of his ‘greater’ Metaphysics into 
English (1885–6) (Milkov 2010). The present paper will also show 
that Lotze also considerably influenced Carl Stumpf. 
Of course, there were also other philosophers of the time that set 
up the character of philosophers born in 1848. One of them was Lot-
ze’s oldest ally in the fight against subjectivist in philosophy, Adolf 
Trendelenburg. Another figure of the same époque was Otto Lieb-
mann, a former student of Lotze, whose famous book Kant und die 
Epigonen (1865) gave birth to the movement of Neo-Kantianism.  
A legion of other scientifically oriented philosophers also in-
spired and educated the generation 1848: Fries, Herbart, and Fechner, 
among others. This point speaks against the claim that ‘the years from 
1830 to 1870 circa were a period of a crisis and decline for philosophy 
in Germany.’ (Libardi 1996, 31) Exactly the opposite: between 1840 
and 1870 German philosophy was on the rise: it prepared the Renais-
sance of philosophy that Stumpf speaks about in his 1907 inaugural 
address as a Rector of the University of Berlin. The historical mission 
of the generation 1848 was that it realized (materialized) its achieve-
ments. Unfortunately, many of these developments remained in shad-
ow till today. 
 
3. Historical Context of the Introduction of the Concept of Inten-
tionality by Brentano 
In order to correctly appreciate the respective influence of Bren-
tano and Lotze on Carl Stumpf, we are first to investigate the related-
ness of Lotze and Brentano as philosophers. There are both differ-
ences and affinities between them. 
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Some authors claim that ‘there was, to be sure, great mutual re-
spect between Brentano and Lotze, as indicated by the fact that Bren-
tano sent two of his pupils,2 Anton Marty and Carl Stumpf, to study 
with Lotze and also by the fact that Lotze played an important role in 
Brentano’s call at the University of Vienna in 1874.’ (Rollinger, 2001 
112) 
In truth, we can scarcely speak about symmetry in the relationship 
between Lotze and Brentano; neither was their relation simply a mat-
ter of mutual respect. Without any doubt, Lotze appreciated Brentano 
as a rising star of German philosophy. This is clear from the fact that 
he was instrumental in Brentano’s instatement as professional philos-
opher. This fact, however, is not to be overestimated. The criteria that 
guided Lotze to support young philosophers were three: ‘Has the per-
son the knowledge that is a necessary in philosophy today; does he 
also has a command of the scientific methods; and is he deadly serious 
with his philosophical interests? Lotze recommended Brentano, start-
ing from these standpoints’, no more than that. (Baumann 1909, 179) 
Furthermore, when in June 1872 Brentano and Stumpf visited Lotze in 
his home near Göttingen (for some reasons, all called it ‘the cafe 
grinder’), ‘Lotze was friendly but discreet [schweigsam], as he often 
was.’ (p. 125) Apparently, Brentano’s visit to Lotze in his home was 
of no extraordinary importance for the latter. 
In short, while Brentano learned much from Lotze, Lotze scarcely 
learned anything from Brentano. To be sure, Lotze was 21 years older 
than Brentano and started early his career so that (as we already have 
mentioned) he was well-established philosopher much before Brenta-
no habilitated in 1866. This point was already noted in the literature: 
‘[Trendelenburg and Lotze] are also … Brentano’s teachers. The his-
torical–philosophical importance of Brentano consists in that he had 
revealed in an exemplary way the strength of these influences in the 
full variety of their forms.’ (Orth 1997, 18) To remind the reader, 
Brentano’s first publication on Aristotle in 1862, that was also his 
PhD Thesis (Brentano 1862), was dedicated to Trendelenburg. 
Also Brentano’s most distinguished achievement—the (re)intro-
duction of the concept of intentionality in philosophy—was prepared 
by Adolf Trendelenburg and Hermann Lotze—above all, by the con-
cept of experienced consciousness that has a process character. ‘Deci-
sive [at that] is the thesis about the absolute difference between psy-
                                                            
2 In fact, there were at least three: Brentano also sent his pupil Johannes Wolff to 
study with Lotze. (1919, 103) 
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chical and physical appearances and about the primacy of the psychi-
cal phenomena over the physical.’ (Orth 1997, 24) 
Two further points are of importance in this respect: (i) Lotze con-
sidered the concept of mind as a ‘phenomenological expression’. 
(ibid., 21 f.) We have no singular referents for the soul but varieties of 
psychical phenomena that are to be described. In this sense Lotze also 
used the term ‘descriptive (or empirical) psychology’. (ii) The presup-
position of the intentionality are satisfied by Lotze’s conception of 
substance as an entity ‘that is capable to effect and to suffer.’ (1879, 
481) 
This whole story shows that Brentano was not a ‘lonely genius’ 
that advanced his philosophy in complete isolation. In this respect the 
attitude of the Neo-Brentanists towards the source of their inspiration, 
Franz Brentano, is related to the attitude of the Neo-Fregeans, such 
like Michael Dummett, towards Gottlob Frege. Both believed that 
Brentano, resp. Frege, were solitary thinkers.  
Even the picture of Brentano, drawn by some more objective his-
torians:  
 
Brentano’s philosophy is part of the Aristotelian Renaissance which 
began with Bonitz’s, Tricot’s and Schwegler’s works on Aristotle, and 
continued with Trendelenburg’s Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. (Li-
bardi 1996, 26)  
 
is incomplete. In fact, the Aristotelian Renaissance itself was part and 
parcel of a massive movement against Kant’s formalism that was 
started in Germany by Friedrich Schleiermacher and was continued by 
such philosophers and logicians like Trendelenburg, Lotze and also 
Frege. The latter, in particular, insisted that his logic, in contrast to 
that of George Boole, is not formal but logic of content.  
 
4. Further Points on which Lotze Preceded Brentano 
But there were also three other points on which the ideas of Lotze 
and Brentano were related. Of course, we are not going to explore 
their genealogical connection since this task goes beyond the scope of 
our study. We only insist that whereas some authors uncritically main-
tain that these ideas were introduced in philosophy by Franz Brentano, 
in fact, they were set up, perhaps in somewhat different form, by 
Hermann Lotze much before him.  
(i) Priority of Judgment in Mental Life.Similarly to Brentano 20 
years later, Lotze radically increased the role of judgment in our men-
tal life. While Kant classified our mental abilities into (i) knowledge, 
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(ii) sentiment, and (iii) desire, Lotze discriminated between (i) 
knowledge, (ii) judgment, and (iii) will. Brentano, on his side, adopted 
from Aristotle the classification of mental states into (i) presentation, 
(ii) judgments, and (iii) feeling. 
 Lotze, in particular, insisted that judgment is not an association of 
two presentations. In this, he opposed the British empiricists Hume 
and Mill. To Stumpf, too, the judgment plays a prime role in of our 
perception of sounds, colours and spaces; and also in our emotions 
and volitions.  
(ii) Content of Mind. Lotze also introduced the concept of ‘con-
tent’—both of experience and of judgment. The content of our experi-
ence are the perceptual data of our knowledge; the content of judg-
ments are the states of affairs.3 (Milkov 2002) Among other things, 
the concept of the content of perceptions gave rise to the concept of 
sense-data. The latter was developed under Lotze’s influence first by 
Josiah Royce (Royce was one year long Lotze’s student in Göttingen), 
and then by William James; much later this concept was adopted by 
the founding fathers of analytic philosophy G. E. Moore and Bertrand 
Russell. (Milkov 2001) This story shows, among other things, how 
Lotze’s ideas, that are clearly related to that of Brentano, also found 
resonance in other philosophical traditions that have little to do with 
Brentano. 
(iii) Objectivism. Much before Brentano, Lotze stopped to explore 
the subject–object opposition, put at the centre of philosophy by Kant. 
Instead, he directed his attention to the order that is characteristic of 
both matter and mind. Especially important place in Lotze’s theory of 
order played the concept of relation. He used to repeat: ‘it belongs to 
the notion and nature of existence to be related.’ (Lotze 1885, ii. 587) 
Beatrice Centi is right when she maintains that, according to Lotze, to 
think means to relate: for him, space is an ‘inter-related seriality’. 
(Centi, p. 72) This, however, does not mean that Lotze never spoke 
about individuals. Indeed, what is related are individuals contents of 
perception. In other words, Lotze’s relationism presupposes ontology 
of individuals. 
 
5. Relatedness and Divergence Between Brentano, Lotze 
and Stumpf: Descriptive Psychology 
 Stumpf himself maintained that ‘Lotze’s views concur with those 
of Brentano only very partly [sehr teilweise].’ (Brentano1919, 102) 
                                                            
3 Cf. § 8, (ii). 
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Negative as this statement is, it makes clear that on some points, at 
least, the positions of Lotze and Brentano coincide.  
 The general point on which Lotze, Brentano and Stumpf agree is 
that philosophy is a part of science: it is a very general science. It thus 
forms a continuum with science.4 As Stumpf put it, philosophy is ‘af-
ter-science’ (Nachwissenschaft); it investigates the common laws of 
all sciences. It is a theory of the world (Welttheorie). (1906, 43) 
 In more specific terms, Stumpf held that both Lotze and Brentano 
explored ‘structural characteristics of mental functions’.5 (1924, 46) 
The point is that in the realm of appearances, there are such things as 
‘immanent laws of structure’ that are rather different from the causal 
laws—the latter are not valid in this realm. (1906, 28) 
 But which were these ‘laws of structure’? They were mainly of two 
types: those explored by the descriptive psychology, and those ex-
plored by, what we shall call, ‘philosophical logic’. We are going to 
discuss the former in the lines of this section bellow, and the latter in § 
6. 
*** 
Following Brentano, Stumpf severely criticized to Kant’s formal-
ism. Kant’s discrimination between form and qualia was not made 
through psychological discussion but through void metaphysical de-
liberations. But ‘nothing can be epistemologically true and psycholog-
ically false.’ (1891, 482) That is why Kant’s criticism was harmful for 
the development of both philosophy and psychology. Indeed, space, 
time and causality, declared by Kant a priori forms of human reason, 
are nothing but contents of consciousness, everyone with specific 
multiplicity. (Ibid., 485) 
 Historically, Brentano opposed Kant following some ideas of Aris-
totle.6 Roughly, while Kant was more of a constructivist philosopher, 
Brentano was a kind of monolithic philosopher. While Kant developed 
a particular ‘predilection for constructions’, Brentano and Stumpf 
tried to bring to light the ‘things themselves’. To be more exact, Bren-
tano introduced the discipline of descriptive psychology as a Cartesian 
science in an effort to provide sound foundations for the whole phi-
                                                            
4 A thesis later revived by Quine. 
5 In his William James book, Stumpf identifies ‘Lotze and Brentano [as] the great 
masters of analytic psycholohy and introspection’. (1928b, 28) 
6 Ultimately, Brentano’s move paralleled Leibniz’s turn back to Aristotle (in Leibniz’s 
case, to Aristotle’s ‘substantial forms’) as a means against the radically mechanical 
philosophy of Locke and Descartes. 
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losophy. Its task is to reveal and describe the building blocks of both 
science and philosophy.  
 It deserves notice that while descriptive psychology was the disci-
pline of Brentano and his school Lotze, in fact, practiced it for dec-
ades. More especially, his analysis of the content of perception was, in 
fact, a form of descriptive psychology. Brentano insisted that descrip-
tion is prior to explanation and to genetic psychology in general, 
‘which seeks to find the laws of mental event as unfolding in time’ 
(Smith 1994, 27). But the very distinction between ‘genetic’ and ‘de-
scriptive’ science was introduced by Lotze who strongly discriminated 
between the given, or what is, what happens, e.g. what changes (i.e. 
what is ‘genetic’), and what is valid. 
It deserves notice that following the physiologist Ewald Hering, 
Carl Sumpf called the descriptive psychology nativist: it explores the 
origin of our mental states: ‘Nativists are called those [scientists] who 
assume the initial [Ursprüngliche], [and] empiricists, those who em-
brace genetic explanations.’ (1883, 96) In other words, Stumpf identi-
fied ‘empirical psychology’ with ‘genetic psychology’. Brentano, in 
contrast, understood descriptive psychology as empiricist psychology.  
For our study, it is of special importance that both Lotze and 
Stumpf combined nativism and experimental psychology. In other 
words, in contrast to Brentano, Stumpf was both a descriptive psy-
chologist and at the same time external (non-introspective) experien-
tial psychologist, who checked the results he achieved in his nativist 
descriptions with experiments, without, however, to commit a ‘genetic 
fallacy’: without to become a genetic psychologist. Brentano’s psy-
chology, in contrast, ‘was empirical [not in Stumpf’s sense] without 
being experimental.’ (Libardi 1996, 36)  
In fact, he advanced a new kind of empiricism that can be also 
called ‘introspective empiricism’. Furthermore, exactly like Lotze, 
Stumpf was not only a philosopher but also a scientist. In contrast, 
despite the fact that in his Dissertation Brentano declared that ‘the true 
method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural science’ 
(Thesis iv), he never did ‘real science’.7 (Ewen 2008, 21) In particular, 
Brentano was never occupied with psychological experiments, prefer-
ring instead to make armchair introspective psychological research.  
In this connection, it deserves notice that in his Address to the Ber-
lin University as its Rector in 1907, ‘The Renaissance of Philosophy’, 
Stumpf repeatedly referred to Fechner and Lotze as his predecessors, 
                                                            
7 Among other things, this point found expression in Brentano’s negative attitude to 
the Theory of Relativity—he found it ‘incoherent’. 
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not to Brentano. The short hegemony of the idealistic systems in Ger-
many ended with a catastrophe: they became obsolete already in the 
1840s. In the 1850s and 1860s, Fechner and Lotze came on the scene, 
developing a bottom-up philosophy that starts from the sciences and 
verified their philosophical statements with the new scientific discov-
eries and theories. Some authors explain this statement of Stumpf with 
the ‘confessional biases of that epoch’ in Germany, having in mind 
that he read his address at the Prussian—and protestant—Berlin Uni-
versity. (Münch 2006, 57 n. 21) In truth, it refers to a serious differ-
ence between Carl Stumpf’s and Franz Brentano’s philosophy.8  
Apparently, ‘Stumpf had a drastically different idea of what scien-
tific methodology actually is. Unlike Brentano, he left no place for 
any prominence of inner perception and its alleged evidence.’ (Marti-
nelli 2006, 82) This gave Ricardo Martinelli reasons enough to call 
him an empiricist.9 As we already have seen, however, Carl Stumpf 
understood himself as a nativist, not as an empiricist. But what Stumpf 
meant when he criticised empiricism was, in fact, the ‘genetic’ ap-
proach in psychology, practised by such colleagues of his like Wil-
helm Wundt.  
*** 
Finally, we are to also mention a point on which Brentano openly 
criticised Lotze. Above all, it was the theory of local signs of the latter 
which explains the relation between mind and matter in terms of our 
perception of space and movement. According to Lotze, what we di-
rectly see when perceiving a movement are only patches of colour. 
What helps us to perceive the fact of movement is the effort that we 
ourselves make in perceiving the movement. Lotze calls this stimulus 
a “local-sign.” It is a means of transforming sense-perceptions into 
space-values. (Milkov 2010, § 3(e)) 
 Stumpf joined Brentano in this critic. Apparently, Brentano and 
Stumpf were against the increased role of the free will in judgment 
that Lotze’s theory introduced. In other words, they were against the 
involvement of a conscious, will-informed action that constitutes our 
reality. It deserves notice that Lotze embraced this theory following an 
idea of J. G. Fichte. In other words, it was a trace of the German Ideal-
ism in his philosophy—a trace that both Brentano and Stumpf felt to 
be alien to their objectivist intuitions.  
 
 
                                                            
8 We shall address this point again in § 9. 
9 The same does Schuhmann (2000/1), 63 ff. 
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6. From Strict Analytic Method to Philosophical Logic 
 The extensive use of experimental methods in descriptive psychol-
ogy was only possible because both Lotze and Stumpf took an idio-
syncratic analytic method as starting point of descriptive psychology. 
Of course, Brentano’s descriptive psychology was also analytic psy-
chology.10 Following further ideas of Lotze, however, Stumpf added 
to it important new elements. Most importantly, Stumpf insisted that 
psychological analysis is possible in two ways: (i) through inner ob-
servations; (ii) through outer observations and experiments. (1879, 5) 
We can add to this that the former method was mainly followed by 
Brentano, the latter mainly by Stumpf. 
In short, Stumpf’s analytic psychology held that  
 
through analysis [Zergliederung] of ‘impressions’, we reach the ulti-
mate elements of concepts that we use in the ordinary thinking; ele-
ments that in the scientific thinking are combined in different ways, ac-
cording to their needs. (1891, 491)  
 
In contrast, Kant was not interested in the origin of space, time and 
causality but in what these concepts contribute to the scientific dis-
course. Besides, Kant’s failed to analyse his ‘intuitions’, so they re-
main complex ideas. Space, for example, is perceived through differ-
ent senses that grasp different parts of it: place, magnitude, etc.  
 Stumpf’s final objective was to put to light the ‘absolute contents’ 
of our mind, especially of our ideas of space and time. In this connec-
tion, he argued against the conception of relativity of perception, de-
fended by Fechner, among others. According to the latter, every per-
ception receives its meaning through connection with other percep-
tions. In contrast, Stumpf held that tones, smells, colors, and tastes, 
are sums of absolute qualities. (1883, 137)  
Furthermore, Stumpf explored the psychological origins (Ur-
sprunge) of our ideas by way of analysis of complex ideas to their 
constituents. Important point is that the complex is not just a sum; but 
it is also not an ‘organic unity’. The relation between complexes and 
elements is a relation between parts and whole. And there are parts 
that are independent from the whole, and there also parts that are onto-
logically dependent on them.  
We shall call this type of philosophical analysis ‘philosophical log-
ic’. It presents an alternative way of disclosing immanent laws of 
                                                            
10 Cf. George Stout’s Analytic Psychology (Stout 1886) written under Brentano’s 
influence. 
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structure to that of the descriptive psychology. The exploration of 
philosophical logic was another debt of Stumpf to Hermann Lotze. 
Prime example of Lotze’s philosophical logic was his method of re-
casting specific problems of German Idealism in a refined, logical 
form. A typical example was his approach to studying thinking. Lotze 
connected thinking to two ‘logically different’ domains, valuing and 
becoming, and considered each of them to be explored by a special 
science: logic investigates the validity of thinking, and (genetic) psy-
chology investigates the development of thinking. 
Typical discovery of Stumpf in philosophical logic was that a kind 
of space is already given with the idea of quality: we cannot imagine 
space without a colour, neither a colour without space. This idea of 
Stumpf profoundly influenced Edmund Husserl’s theory of ‘ground-
ing’ (fundieren): there are concepts that exist autonomously, and other 
kind of concepts that are ontologically dependent on the autonomous 
concepts. Husserl himself loudly acknowledged his debt to Stumpf on 
this point,11 a point that was unknown to Brentano. (Husserl 1901).  
At the end of this section we would like to point out that Stumpf’s 
analytic psychology was unexpectedly close to some leading ideas of 
the founding fathers of analytic philosophy. Above all, the program 
for investigating ‘absolute contents’, as developed in Tonpsychologie 
(1883–1890), was closely related to the ontology of Russell’s logical 
atomism.12 Besides, Stumpf’s conception of judgment was very close 
to that of Frege as developed in his famous paper ‘On Sense and Ref-
erence’. Indeed, Stumpf was explicit that judgment plays a central role 
not only in the art or in politics, ‘but already in the most elementary 
spontaneous [unwillkürlicher] comprehension and interpretation of 
sense-impressions.’ (1899, 5) It is active in every space orientation. A 
related position is defended in Tonpsychologie: 
 
Judging, as we understand it, does not always consist in deliberations 
and is not always connected with language, even not with inner speech. 
In many situations it is immediately and instantly connected with sense 
impressions. (1883, 4)  
 
Similarly, Frege claimed that with every ‘serious’ thought we have 
when we are awake (i.e. not in a game, or in a daydream), for exam-
                                                            
11 Husserl did so even in the short Summary of his Logical Investigations, vol. 2, he 
himself composed. (Husserl 1901) 
12 One explanation of the fact that Stumpf’s ontology is close to the analytic philoso-
phy of Russell is the influence Hermann Lotze exercised on the early Russell. (Milkov 
2008)  
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ple, ‘It’s raining now!’, we already judge a situation as true or false: 
‘the step from the level of thought to the level of reference (the objec-
tive) is already done [in it]’.13 (Frege 1892, 34) 
 
7.  Further Points of Relatedness Between Lotze and 
Stumpf 
We have already noted that although Stumpf started his philosoph-
ical development as a devoted Brentanist, he gradually distanced him-
self from the theoretical position of his teacher—despite the fact that 
emotionally, he remained Brentano’s loyal devotee. Furthermore, 
most of Stumpf’s differences with Brentano were a result of his ap-
prenticeship with Lotze. In the lines above we already have mentioned 
some specific ideas that Stumpf inherited from Lotze. In this section, 
we are going to add another three points of influence that can be only 
expressed in more general terms. 
(i) Stumpf as Non-Dogmatic Philosopher. Similarly to Lotze, and 
in contrast to Franz Brentano, Carl Stumpf was not a dogmatic philos-
opher. He claimed that exactly like science, philosophy is to be a co-
operative study and not just a matter of schools and sects. (1907, 194; 
Münch 2006, 14)  
A good example of this stance, as developed by Lotze, was that 
even Stumpf’s open criticism of his theory of logical signs didn’t 
harm the personal friendship between teacher and student (1917, 5). 
Exactly the opposite was the attitude of Franz Brentano to his stu-
dents. Prominent case was Stumpf’s discussion with Brentano as to 
does pleasure have a content or not. More especially, Stumpf denied 
Brentano’s position that sense perceptions (bodily pain, pleasure, etc.) 
have content. Content have only our emotions in form of particular 
states of affairs.  
Stumpf’s dispute with Brentano on emotions had disastrous con-
sequences:  
 
[Brentano] blamed Stumpf in a bitter tone for his deviations from the 
original doctrine, and suggested, as wrote Stumpf in his preface, 
                                                            
13 Some authors insist, referring to Paul Linke (1876–1955), that ‘many of Frege’s 
theories had been developed within Brentano’s school.’ (Hill 1998, 45) In fact, the 
otherwise enigmatic relatedness between Frege and Brentano’s school can be com-
fortably explained with Frege’s relatedness to Lotze’s logic which is an established 
fact. (Gabriel 1989) If we connect this point with Lotze’s relatedness to Brentano we 
have already said much about above, then the genealogical circle of influence gets 
closed. Parts of Frege’s logic show relatedness to Brentano and his school since both 
Brentano and Frege adopted vital ideas of Hermann Lotze. 
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‘that I seemed to be a dissident for him’. … There followed a long 
controversy in the correspondence and in a series of published pa-
pers, which lasted until Brentano’s death in 1917. (Fisette 2011, 40–
1)  
 
The effect of this attitude of his teacher was clearly negative for 
Stumpf’s intellectual development. Above all, it narrowed the scope 
of his philosophical explorations. Later Stumpf remembered:  
 
I admit that this was one of my motives for developing a considera-
ble amount of time to the area of the psychology of sound and 
acoustical observation. There I could hope to achieve something 
useful without taking a position of agreement or dissent with regard 
to a great number of unpublished views of the teacher. It was the 
same with Marty in philosophy of language and Kraus in philosophy 
of law. (1919, 145) 
 
(ii) Stumpf Didn’t Ground His Own Philosophical School. One 
upshot of Lotze’s theoretical liberalist was that he didn’t found his 
own philosophical school. This was out of question exactly because of 
the ‘exceptional considerate liberality [of Lotze] in relation to every 
personal development. The individual person was for him an untouch-
able sanctity.’ (1917, 10) In a radical contrast with Brentano, Lotze 
instructed his readers to regard his philosophy as ‘an open market, 
where the reader may simply pass by the goods he does not want’ 
(Lotze 1874, p. 4). 
Similarly to Lotze and in contrast to Brentano, Stumpf never set 
up a school of philosophers, despite the fact that among his pupils 
there were such prominent figures like Edmund Husserl, Wolfgang 
Köhler and Kurt Lewin.14 (To some extent, Stumpf can be only con-
sidered the father of the school of Gestalt-psychology.) Apparently, 
this was also the main reason why Stumpf, the philosopher, was deliv-
ered to oblivion for decades—a fate he shared with his teacher in phi-
losophy Hermann Lotze. 
We further maintain that the difference in method of teaching, 
dogmatic or liberal, was not simply a William Jamesian matter of 
temperament. It reflects the difference in the philosophical method 
employed by Brentano, on the one hand, and Lotze–Stumpf, on the 
other hand. While the philosophy of Brentano was more of deductive 
and synoptic, the philosophy of Lotze–Stumpf was supposed to be led 
by empirical research—it so proceeded bottom-up, and was developed 
                                                            
14 We are going to discuss Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Lewin as philosophers in § 9. 
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step-by-step, pecemeal. Stumpf himself maintained that ‘[Brentano’s] 
advantage was in the deductive part of the [nativist] method, in the 
set-up of most general perspectives.’ (1919, 147) 
It cannot be a surprise, therefore, that Brentano was close to other 
deductive philosophers, like Husserl and Frege, also in another re-
spect: he was dogmatic in regard of any further elaboration of his phi-
losophy. Closer to Lotze–Stumpf, in contrast, were some empirically 
oriented philosophers, such like Russell and Carnap, who practiced an 
‘open door policy’, encouraging correction of their own philosophy 
through their students. (Milkov 2012) 
(iii) Theoretical Persistency. Finally, Lotze and Stumpf were also 
related in that they both didn’t radically change their position in phi-
losophy. In contrast, Brentano’s philosophy has its Part One and Part 
Two: while the early Brentano was a descriptive psychologist, in his 
second, ontologically-oriented phase, he developed an idiosyncratic 
philosophy of reism. 
 
8. The Concepts of Space and State of Affairs 
Important characteristic of Carl Stumpf as a philosopher was that 
he inherited Lotze’s interest in the external world: a stance that put 
space, time and numbers at centre of his philosophy. Among other 
things, this point is supported by the fact that in his Göttingen years 
(1868–1873), Stumpf was also on good terms with the philosopher 
Julius Baumann, to which exactly the concepts of space, time and 
numbers were of prime importance.15 Unfortunately, Stumpf didn’t 
develop his ontological interests in full. As a young philosopher, he 
was seriously working in theory of numbers and even wrote his Habil-
itation Thesis on this subject. (1870) Still in Göttingen, however, his 
friend Felix Klein convinced him that new developments in mathe-
matics made his position inconsistent. In consequence, Stumpf decid-
ed not to publish it. As regards Stumpf’s philosophy of time, apparent-
ly, he was hampered to develop it because of the paralyzing effect of 
Brentano on his students we already spoke about: indeed, Brentano 
himself worked on psychology of time perception. 
Be this as it can, the only area in which Stumpf developed his on-
tological intuitions in full were the problems of space and state of 
affairs. 
                                                            
15 Baumann’s Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik in der neueren Philosophie 
(1869) was the book which Frege most often referred to in his Grundlagen der Arith-
metik (1884): it was Frege’s main source of historical information in philosophy of 
arithmetic. 
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(i) Space. Similarly to Kant, Lotze held that space and time are 
forms of intuition that make our knowledge possible. In contrast to 
Kant, however, he discriminated between extension and place / mo-
ment. Extension is a conceptual (formal) notion and refers to an infi-
nite multiplicity of possible directions. Only a place in space or a 
moment in time, however, makes them reality.16 With this conception, 
Lotze tried to preserve the objective character of space and time, op-
posing in this way Kant’s subjectivism. 
Stumpf developed Lotze’s objective conception of space and time 
further into the idea that the places and moments are perceptual con-
tents (Sinnesinhalte). These are psychological phenomena. ‘A per-
ceived space is not composed of many identical impressions, but a 
unity in which we can discern [through analysis] different parts.’ 
(1873, 126) Moreover, the order is ontologically dependent on con-
tent: indeed, ‘there is no order which is not based on an absolute con-
tent.’ (Ibid., 275)  
(ii) States of Affairs.Following Smith (1992) and also Stumpf 
himself, many philosophers today maintain that the concept of states 
of affairs was introduced in Stumpf’s manuscript lectures on logic 
(1888). Beatrice Centi had recently added to this that Stumpf also 
‘uses the term Sachverhalt before the year 1888, in a less technical but 
not less significant sense due to its generality, in the same way as he 
uses the term series.’ (Centi, p. 77) More especially, Stumpf’s concept 
of states of affairs as the concept of judgment was ‘rooted in a wider 
concept of state of affairs expressing the intrinsic and totally subject-
independent relationality of reality.’ (Ibid., p. 78) Indeed, Stumpf con-
stantly explored how do contents relate to one another: ‘how does 
space and quality relate to one another [sich zueinander verhalten]?’17 
(1873, 107, 114) This was actually the tenor of the Raumbuch. 
In fact, however, the use of the concept of state of affairs in the 
Raumbuch, which Centi refers to in support of her claim, is neither in 
the sense of content of judgment, nor in the sense of contents related 
to one another. Rather, it is used in the trivial sense of a case (casus) 
that is also popular in the ordinary German today, especially in the 
legal discourse. In contrast, in his ‘great’ Logic (1874), i.e. much be-
fore 1888, Lotze repeatedly refers to the concept of states of affairs in 
                                                            
16 Among other things, this position deeply influenced Bertrand Russell’s philosophy 
of space and time.  (Milkov 2008) 
17 This is also a part of Wittgenstein conception of states of affairs advanced in the 
Tractatus: ‘In states of affairs the objects are combined in a definite way [verhalten 
sich die Gegenstände … zueinander].’ (2.031) 
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the sense of content of judgment. (Milkov 2002) The Neo-Brentanists 
are reluctant to recognize this fact because they fail to realize that 
already Lotze introduced the concept of content of judgment as well 
as of the content of perception in philosophy.18 Otherwise, it is really 
the case that the concept of states of affairs is rooted in relativist on-
tology: in the relativist ontology of Lotze, however, which was devel-
oped much earlier and genealogically preceded that of Carl Stumpf. 
Indeed, Lotze spoke about contents that relate to one another already 
in his ‘lesser’ Logic. (1843, 25) 
 
9. Carl Stumpf’s Philosophical Acolytes 
Looking to Carl Stumpf as another member of the Brentano’s 
School, some authors ask the question: ‘was Stumpf, who received his 
repute as experimental psychologist, a philosopher at all’? (Münch 
2006, 12) The author who poses this question, Dieter Münch, eventu-
ally answers it in positive. But the very fact that it was posed, says 
much about the state of Stumpf studies today. 
One of the arguments for denying Stumpf the status of a philoso-
pher is that, ‘apparently, Stumpf lacks the philosophical ambition that 
characterizes Brentano and his school. He had neither Brentano’s 
sense of mission, nor the relentless defending stance, typical for 
Marty, Kraus and other followers of Brentano.’ (Ibid., 13) We consid-
er this view radically mistaken. Stumpf had both strong philosophical 
interest, and also a clear philosophical message. These, however, 
didn’t look in the direction of the mainstream Brentano’s school 
members. 
One of the reasons for denying Stumpf the status of philosopher 
is that, allegedly, he had just one philosophy pupil—Edmund Husserl. 
This claim is not true either. In fact, Stumpf also exerted a forming 
influence on the Berlin Group around Hans Reichenbach (1928–1933) 
and on the Society for Scientific Philosophy (1927–1935) that had 
program parallel to but at the same time clearly different from the 
program of the Vienna Circle.19 
To be more exact, Stumpf influenced the Berlin Group mainly 
through his closest pupils, Kurt Lewin und Wolfgang Köhler, who 
were also members of the Board of the aforementioned Society. Lew-
in and Köhler also took part in the first Conference of Exact Philoso-
phy in Erlangen in March 1923 and were instrumental by establishing 
                                                            
18 Cf. § 3, (b). 
19 In short, while Vienna Circle defended logical positivism, the Berlin Group defend-
ed the philosophy of logical empiricism. (Milkov 2013) 
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the Zeitschrift für exakte Philosophie in 1923 (the journal never ap-
peared). (Milkov 2011, xiv) Later both of them contributed papers to 
the legendary journal of scientific philosophy Erkenntnis (1930–9). 
Köhler also acted as a reader of the Doctoral Theses of the core mem-
bers of the Berlin Group Walter Dubislav and Carl Hempel. Besides, 
between 1920 and 1929 Hans Reichenbach and Paul Oppenheim 
worked close together with Kurt Lewin. Rudolf Carnap, in his The 
Logical Construction of the World, and Hans Reichenbach, in Philos-
ophy of Space and Time (both 1928), made extensive use of Kurt 
Lewin’s term of genidentity. (cf. Padovani 2013) Finally, another core 
member of the Berlin Group, Kurt Grelling, explored (partly together 
with Paul Oppenheim) the logical aspects of Gestalt theory. 
That Carl Stumpf’s philosophy is related to the scientific philos-
ophy as developed in the second half of the twentieth century is also 
clear from a number of claims he made. We have already noted (in § 
5) that Stumpf repeatedly spoke about the ‘catastrophe’ resulting from 
the supremacy of the philosophy of the German Idealism between 
1790 and 1840. The ‘Renaissance of philosophy’, started up in the 
mid-nineteenth century, following the (re)introduction of special sci-
ences, especially the introduction of psychology, into it.  
Reading some of Stumpf’s papers, one gets the impression that 
what Bertrand Russell and Hans Reichenbach later have called the 
‘rise of scientific philosophy’, in fact already took place in the 1850s 
and 1860s in Germany thanks to such scientifically oriented philoso-
phers like Fechner and Lotze. Both of them were not only philoso-
phers but also scientists: Lotze was also a Professor of medicine and 
Fechner was also a physicist. This is how the rebirth of philosophy 
was realized. To Stumpf, it is important that ‘philosophers learn and 
are trained in a specific craft [Handwerk] which means that they have 
to have experience in some concrete area of either humanities [Ge-
sisteswissenschaften] or natural sciences.’ (1907, 179) Only experts 
trained in this way can produce ‘a philosophy which has an exact con-
cept-formation and strict proofs.’ (Ibid., 180) Precisely this way of 
working made Leibniz great philosopher also today.20 
Most importantly, Carl Stumpf’s program for renewal of philoso-
phy was very close to that of Hans Reichenbach not only in the direc-
tion it followed but also in its content. Indeed, Stumpf advanced a 
kind of empirical philosophy (Erfahrungsphilosophie) that progresses 
                                                            
20 Carl Stumpf started the German Leibniz Academic edition in 1923 writing for it an 
enthusiastic preface. (The edition is still not finished. Cf. http://www.leibniz-
edition.de/) 
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step by step, and whose aim is to achieve a ‘relative conclusion’,21 so 
that ‘every higher step [of science] conveys new life-impulses [to 
philosophy]’. (Stumpf 1907, 170) Similarly, according to Reichen-
bach, every significant scientific discovery and theory is to be logical-
ly explored in order to distill the constitutive principles of the renewed 
science. (Milkov 2011, ix)  
In this connection it deserves notice that Reichenbach was Carl 
Stumpf’s student at the University of Berlin. Apparently, Stumpf’s 
lessons didn’t remain without a trace for Reichenbach’s formation as a 
philosopher. And the main reason why the relation between Stumpf 
and Reichenbach didn’t develop in full form was ideological rather 
than theoretical. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Carl 
Stumpf was namely conceived of as an anti-social-revolutionary phi-
losopher, while for Reichenbach the revolution in philosophy was part 
and parcel of the social revolution. (Milkov 2012, § 5) In more detail, 
being a Chancellor of the Berlin University, Stumpf was engaged in a 
conflict (he himself spoke of a ‘war’) with the left-wing ‘free student 
movement’ (cf. 1908); ultimately, he dissolved that society. Later the 
society was restored and, understandably, its members saw Stumpf as 
another old-fashioned ‘bourgeois’ philistine. At the beginning of the 
1910s, Hans Reichenbach was a very engaged member of the free-
students movement and, by all accounts, adopted the negative attitude 
to his philosophy professor from the older fellow-students. It deserves 
also notice that psychologically, Reichenbach was very sensitive in 
respect of who supports his endeavors and who, he believed, was 
against them. 
  
                                                            
21 Cf. with the concept of ‘relative a priori’ as developed in Friedman 2001. Fried-
man’s main point of inspiration by elaborating this conception was the scientific 
philosophy of the early Hans Reichenbach. 
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